Abstract. Logic programming languages based on linear logic are of both theoretical and practical interest, particulaly because such languages can be seen as providing a logical basis for programs which execute within a dynamic environment. Most linear logic programming languages are implemented using standard resolution or backward chaining techniques. However, there are many applications in which the combination of such techniques with forward chaining ones are desirable. We develop a proof-theoretic foundation for a system which combines both forms of reasoning in linear logic.
Introduction
Backward chaining is a standard technique in automated deduction, particularly in logic programming systems, often taking the form of a version of Robinson's resolution rule [18] . The fundamental question is to determine whether or not a given formula follows from a given set of formulae, and there are various techniques which can be used to guide the search for a proof.
An instance of this approach is the analysis of logic programming in intuitionisitic logic [13] . The standard such analysis is that of Miller et al. [13] , based around the notion of uniform proofs. These are defined in terms of the sequent calculus, which is well-known to be suited for analyses of backward-chaining.
With more recent interest in logic programming languages based on linear logic [6] , the natural extension of these backward chaining techniques to linear logic has been much studied [1, 2, 4, 9, 17] ; generally, it follows a similar pattern to intuitionistic logic. The details of the analysis are more intricate than in intuitionistic logic, and there are a number of points of diversion amongst the various approaches, but the same general procedure is followed.
Whilst the sequent calculus is a good basis for backward chaining, other systems for inference in intuitionistic logic provide forward chaining capabilities. Hilbert-type systems are the oldest and perhaps best-known of such systems [10] . Such systems allow different logics to be specified by different sets of axioms whilst maintaining modus ponens as the sole means of inference.
Another technical expression of forward chaining in intuitionistic logic may be found in the Ì È operator used in the semantics of logic programs. Here, a mapping is made from interpretations to interpretations, in which the image is the result of applying the rules of the program to the initial interpretation via a combination of modus ponens and unification. The semantics of the program is then given by the least fixed point of this operator. It is interesting to note that this forward chaining system is traditionally used to provide a fixpoint semantics for SLD-resolution [3] , a backward-chaining system. It should be noted that a key property of the modus ponens rule in intuitionistic logic is that it preserves equivalence:
. This strong property greatly simplifies the analysis of this rule of inference.
A combination of both backward and forward chaining may be found in deductive database systems such as Aditi [20] . In such systems, which are based on variants of Prolog, forward chaining is generally used in order to compute all answers to a query using efficient join algorithms and other techniques from relational databases, whilst backward chaining is used for less data-intensive computational tasks (such as format conversions).
The properties of forward and backward chaining systems for intuitionistic logic are generally well-understood. However, the question of how to best integrate the two models still remains. Give that Hilbert-type systems generally do not make any provision for backward chaining techniques, it seems reasonable to address the question of integration by investigating the incorporation of forward chaining features into the sequent calculus. This is achieved by inserting directed cuts into an otherwise cut-free sequent calculus proof. Cut-free proofs are generally used in proof search to avoid a significant amount of non-determinism (i.e., having to choose a cut formula arbitrarily); in the case of a directed cut, the cut formula will be calculated from the antecedent, and hence will not have the same problem.
The presence of both backward and forward chaining mechanisms in deductive databases suggests that a similar integration for linear logic will prove fruitful, especially as linear logic has been used to model database updates, state and action problems and concurrency.
However, the use of modus ponens in linear logic is not as simple as in intuitionistic logic since modus ponens does not preserve linear equivalence. For example, in linear logic Ô ª´Ô´Õµ Õ but in proving Õ we have to "consume" Ô.
In Ü 2, we discuss the issues for integrating forward chaining into intuitionistic logic; in Ü 3, we give a similar discussion for linear logic. In Ü 4, we present our formal results; in Ü 5, we show that our inference rules respect an encoding of intuitionistic logic programs into linear ones.
Forward Chaining in Intuitionistic Logic
The classic account of backward chaining (or goal-directed) inference in intuitionistic logic is [13] . There it is shown how the following class of formulae, known as hereditary Harrop formulae, can be used in a backward-chaining manner:
Definite formulae: ::= Ü Goal formulae:
::=
Ü Ü
The key question is then how to introduce an appropriate notion of forward chaining into this framework. Our notion of forward chaining is based on directed cuts. It is standard in backward chaining systems to omit the cut rule in proof search; in general, the cut formula is entirely arbitrary, making backward chaining proof search involving this rule infeasible. This omission is safe, in that the cut-elimination theorem ensures that it is complete to search for only cut-free proofs. In our case, we wish to introduce a particular kind of cut known as a directed or analytic cut. Here, whilst the cut formula is not known in advance, we are able to determine it using certain inference rules, which thus form nthe forward chaining aspect of computation.
Hence our general procedure is to replace an inference with conclusion È , arrived at using the usual rules of the intuitionistic sequent calculus, with one of the form In order to produce the appropriate inference rules for , recall that as is intended as a relation between programs (and hence definite formulae), we may consider as a means of making definite inferences (i.e., between sets of definite formulae) and as a means of making potentially indefinite inferences (i.e., with definite formulae in the antecedent and a goal formula in the succedent). As a result, we rewrite the inference rule L as below.
Similar remarks apply to the rules L, WL and CL. The case for L is somewhat more intricate (unsurprisingly). The instance of this rule specialized to definite and goal formulae is as follows.
The left hand premise has a directed cut introduced into it. There are then two different forms of this rule, depending on the status of ¡. If ¡ is a goal formula ¼ , then we have the rule
This means that È can be "updated" to È ¼ before being used for inference.
Turning to other rules for , it seems reasonable to require that the relation be reflexive, transitive and monotonic, resulting in the following rules:
In addition, it would seem reasonable to include a version of the cut rule in which
Given these rules, it is possibly to simplify the implication rules.
In particular, we can omit the rightmost premise of the . We can recover the original rule by use of the Cut rule as follows:
Also, the rule can be replaced by a combination of the (simplified) rule and Cut , as follows:
Hence we arrive at the following set of inference rules:
The rule has the usual restriction that Ý is not free in È or .
Note that the Cut and rules have the same premises. Note also that the rules and are reminiscent of the mapping of [13] . In fact, if we were to replace the L and L rules of the intuitionistic sequent calculus with and respectively, then these two rules would effectively construct the mapping. One final issue is that as is a proof relation between definite formulae, we need to take some care when "synchronising" an inference È È ¼ with È ¼ . For example, we have that Ü Ô´Üµ Þ Ô´ ´Þµµ and Ü Ô´Üµ Ô´ ´Ýµµ, but Ô´ ´Ýµµ Þ Ố ´Þµµ. Hence when interpreting a succedent È ¼ in È È ¼ , we need to "repackage" the formulae in È ¼ . We shall revisit this issue in more detail in the next section.
Forward Chaining in MAILL
Here we look to extend the above analysis to the fragment of linear logic known as MAILL (Multiplicative Additive Intuitionistic Linear Logic), in which the connective Ç is absent. There is no great technical problem with extending the analysis to the full logic, but the development is conceptually simpler without it.
One of the key technical issues when extending the above considerations to logics which contain multiplicative rules is that modus ponens no longer preserves equivalence. As the rules of contraction and weakening do not apply, we now have to make a choice as to whether to use a given instance of a formula as an "input" to a rule, or to preserve it. For example, in the multiplicative fragment of linear logic, we have that Ô Ô´Õ Õ, but that Ô Ô´Õ Ô ª Õ, and Ô Ô´Õ Ô AE Õ. Hence the modus ponens rule acts more like a committed choice, as, unlike the pure intuitionistic case, there is no way to preserve equivalence.
The mixture of multiplicative and additive fragments introduces further complexities. For example, consider the program Ô ´Ô´Õµ. Here we can either use Ô as an "input" to the rule ´Ô´Õµ, but as we cannot make a copy of Ô, in doing so we "lose" the use of Ô. Hence, we have both Ô ´Ô´Õµ Ô and Ô ´Ô´Õµ Õ, according to whether we preserve or use Ô. One way to express this succinctly is to note that in this case we have that Ô ´Ô´Õµ Ô AE Õ.
Hence the interaction between the multiplicative and additive fragments in this way is an important technical issue.
As for the intuitionistic case above, we wish to be able to replace (roughly speaking)
any occurrence of È in a backward chaining proof with È È ¼ and È ¼ (i.e., incorporating into this inference a linear version of the Cut rule), thus converting it into a mixed forward chaining and backward chaining proof. First, let us consider the´L rule of intuitionistic linear logic (specialized appropriately to definite formula and goal formulae):
As above, we readily obtain the rule
and similarly the rule
As above, the´ rule can be simplified (by omitting the rightmost premise) and the´ rule eliminated by an appropriate use of the rules Cut and Cut .
Also as above, we re-write the left rules ( L, ªL, AEL, L, 1L, W L, C L) in the obvious manner.
Two further points of difference with the intuitionistic case remain. One is that, as discussed above, the linear version of modus ponens does not preserve equivalence.
Hence it is possible for there to be two programs È ½ and È ¾ such that È È ½ and È È ¾ where È ½ and È ¾ are not equivalent, which makes it seem reasonable to adopt the following rule (modulo the comments on reconstruction below):
It is this rule that enables us to conclude that Ô ´Ô´Õµ Ô AE Õ ´Ô´Õµ, which enables us to state completeness results in a straightforward manner.
The other is that in order to be able to make appropriate conclusions involving exponentials (and in particular), it seems necessary to include a version of the R of the linear sequent calculus.
As noted above, as is a relation between programs, in proof-theoretic terms it is a relation between antecedents. Hence given È È ¼ , it will generally be the case that È ¼ is in clausal form, which means that reconstruction of the program corresponding to È ¼ will be necessary. Note that in order to derive the final result of Ü Ö´ ´Üµµ ª Ý ×´ ´Ýµµ, we need to "package up" the final state reached, essentially by using the equivalent of the left inference rules L and ªL. This is just the inverse of the clausal decomposition mapping of [17] ; in order to recover the appropriate program from the derived multiset of clausal formulae, we need to use the inverse of this mapping.
For example, if we find that È Ô´Üµ ṌÜµ ÖÝµ , then we interpret this as showing that È ´ Ü ỐÜµ ª Õ´Üµµ ª Ý ÖÝµ.
A Calculus and Its Properties
First we define the class of definite and goal formulae under consideration. This is essentially the class of formulae from [17] restricted to MAILL (i.e., no occurrences of Ç or ?). We also omit goals containing implications, again for reasons of technical simplicity. However, we permit formulae of the form ´ rather than just ´ , which are more natural for forward chaining proofs. As the example of the previous section shows, we need to be able to reconstruct a program from its "decomposed" form. As noted in [17] , it is important to know whether a given variable has been quantified within the scope of a or not. For example, in the formula Ü ÝÔ´Ü Ýµ Ü is global, i.e., it does not require renaming when the formula is copied, and Ý is local, i.e., it does require renaming when the formula is copied. As in [17] , we will assume that there is a means of identifying global and local variables from their names alone, which will resolve the ambiguity above.
Note also that Ü Ý Ô´Ü Ýµ and Ü Ý Ô´Ü Ýµ are equivalent, and hence we do not need any finer distinctions than global and local in the above sense.
It should also be noted that unlike in classical logic (and to a lesser extent, intuitionistic logic) we cannot simply move quantifiers past formulae which do not contain the quantified variable. For example, Ü Ô ª Õ´Üµ is not equivalent to Ô ª Ü Õ´Üµ.
However, it is possible to argue that the latter version is more natural than the former. Hence we introduce below the notion of tightly quantified formulae.
The key point is to determine the appropriate place for quantifiers. This is not simply a matter of finding all formulae which contain the quantified variable. For example, given the formula Ô´Ü Ýµ ª Õ´Ý Þµ ª Ö´Þ Ü µ, it should be clear that the appropriate quantified formula is Ü Ý Þ ỐÜ Ýµ ª Õ´Ý Þµ ª Ö´Þ Ü µ. However, for the formula Ô´Ü ÝµªÕ´Ý ÞµªÖ´Ú Ûµ, it would be´ Ü Ý Þ ỐÜ ÝµªÕ´Ý Þµµª´ Ú Û ÖÚ Ûµµ. We will assume that all programs under consideration in this paper from hereon are tightly quantified.
We are now in a position to define the "recomposition"operator. Note that as all formulae are tightly quantified, all we need to do to determine where the quantifier should be is to determine the minimal scope which includes all occurrences of the (free) variable in question.
Below we present the inference rules for the system.
Definition 4.
A derivation tree is a proof tree governed by the following rules:
We will often use È È ¼ as a shorthand for the statement that È È ¼ has a derivation tree. We now show that the rules above are sound, i.e., that any proof in the above system has a corresponding proof in the linear sequent calculus. In order to prove a corresponding completeness result, we need the concept of the depth of a formula, which will form a bound on the indefinite part of the proof (i.e., the part that uses rules for rather than ). Hence we are now in a position to consider completeness.
Proposition 2 (Completeness).
Let È be a multiset of definite formulae, be a definite formula and be a goal formula. Then Note that (1) above directly reflects that is an alternative characterization of provability between definite formulae. (2) above is a slight restatement of this, in that a given definite formula could be the result of a proof (using ) involving weakening, which corresponds to a proof (using ) in which Ï is used. (3) is a moderately general completeness result, and (4) is an extreme instance of it. As noted above, (3) is trivially true in that È È. However, note that there may be many È ¼ with this property, including one, as shown in (4), in which the forward chaining aspect is maximized, as the size of the backward chaining one is limited to the minimum number of inferences required to decompose into atoms. Hence (3) and (4) between them show the range of possibilities for mixing the two approaches to inference.
It should be clear that the amount of mandatory forward chaining is inversely proportional to the degree of freedom allowed in the proof of È ¼
; the greater the freedom, the more scope there is for backward chaining. Hence strategies which are neither maximal nor minimal in this respect will require an appropriate statement of the requirements for the proof.
One aspect of the inference rules above is that the W rule (like its counterpart in the linear sequent calculus) can always be permuted upwards. This means that consequences are not "lost" in the computation, but in the manner of 2 above, can be "picked out" of the context. In practice, we would not expect to use the W rule, in order to retain as much information as possible.
Another observation is that it is always possible to use a version of the´ rule in which the left hand premise is an axiom. Basically, this normalized form of the rule corresponds to a greater degree of forward chaining, in that we do not have an intermediate 
A proof is strong if it contains no occurrences of W .
Basic proofs are such that repeated occurrences of the´ rule are not nested, but occur sequentially (combined by occurrences of Cut , where necessary). Hence basic proofs are "flatter" with respect to occurrences of´ than non-basic ones. This may be considered the technical effect of ensuring that only "definite" information is used in forward chainAnne64ing inferences, in that the information used to prove the body of the clause is directly present in the program.
Strong proofs give a technical characterization of the observation that information should be preserved, whenever possible, and hence the W rule should be avoided. It is not hard to establish the following results. 
(Sketch) A simple induction based on the upward permutability of W and its absorption into the Axiom rule.
Encoding IL in MAILL
In [17] , the following mapping was used to encode hereditary Harrop formulae into linear logic, and it was shown that this encoding respects uniform provability.
If we take this encoding of hereditary Harrop formulae into a fragment of the linear counterpart, then there is a proof of the original sequent in intuitionistic logic iff there is a proof of the encoded sequent in linear logic.
Applying this encoding to the rules governing a derivation tree in linear logic yields the rules governing a derivation tree in intuitionistic logic. In the following we use a subscript Ä or Á to indicate which system of rules we are using. More formally we have that 1. È Á iff´Èµ · Ä´ µ [17] , and 2. È Á È ¼ iff´Èµ · Ä´È ¼ µ ·
In order to show the second of these results, firstly we observe that a number of rules ( Ù Ø , Ù Ø , Ü ÓÑ , and Ï ) are common to the two systems.
Next we observe that applying the encoding´µ · to a program always yields a collection of clauses whose outermost connective is , that is if´Èµ · È ¼ then È ¼ È ¼¼ for some È ¼¼ . In order to derive a suitable È ¼¼ we may need to use the equivalencé Èµ ª´ Éµ ´È AE Éµ.
Given that the programs produced by the encoding are of this form the structural rules (Ï and ) in the two systems are obviously equivalent. Also, the intuitionistic axiom rule 
where Ý is not free in , ¡.
